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FEDERAL TAX LIENS AND FORECLOSURES
WILLIAm F. MosNim*
In the ordinary course of events, an attorney who re-
ceives an adverse decision from the Court of Appeals based
solely on statutory law - or the lack of it - knows well
that the opinion will state, "If the recognized rule of law
is to be changed, this is a matter for the Legislature, and
not for this Court." Be the disappointed lawyer a crusading
soul - or one with many friends in Annapolis - he may
succeed in having a bill enacted to achieve the statutory
change he feels desirable. However, the reverse of the
picture is most unexpected - that the Courts, after the
Legislature has considered a proposed amendment and
rejected it, will construe existing law to achieve the re-
sult denied by the Legislature. And, once again, the
Supreme Court of the United States has done the unex-
pected.
In its opinion of June 13, 1960, in United States v.
Brosnan,' the Supreme Court has ruled that the fore-
closure of a senior mortgage under State procedure will
completely wipe out junior Federal tax liens, without prior
notice to the Government, without joining the Government
in the case, and without a one-year right of redemption
attaching to the sale.
Perhaps a brief history of the matter would be en-
lightening. As was pointed out in an earlier article pub-
lished in the Maryland Law Review,2 there existed a
considerable problem with respect to establishing clear
title at a foreclosure sale when a Federal tax lien had been
filed against the owner prior to sale. Even though the
defaulted mortgage was senior to the tax lien, the practi-
cally unanimous holding of the cases reported at the time
the prior article was written established the principle that
a tax lien could only be discharged as provided by Federal
statutea This meant by one of three ways: (1) applying
* Of the Baltimore County Bar; LL.B., 1952, University of Maryland
School of Law.
'363 U.S. 237 (1960).
2Mosner, The Nature and Scope of Federal Tam Liens with a Special
Consideration of Their Effect on Mortgage Foreclosures, 17 Md. L. Rev.
1 (1957).
a See Michigan v. United States, 317 U.S. 338 (1943) ; United States v.
Kensington Shipyard & Drydock Corp., 169 F. 2d 9 (3rd Cir. 1948) ; Metro-
politan Life Ins. Co. v. United- States, 107 F. 2d 311 (6th Cir. 1939);
Miners Say. Bank of Pittston, Pa. v. United States, 110 F. 'Supp. 563 (Pa.
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to the Secretary of the Treasury for a discharge under
Section 6325, Internal Revenue Code of 1954; (2) bringing
suit to clear title in the Federal Court under the cumber-
some provisions of Section 7424, Internal Revenue Code of
1954; (3) joining the United States as a party in the State
foreclosure case under Title 28, U.S.C.A., Section 2410,
which allows the Government one year from date of sale in
which to redeem.
None of the three methods afforded a really practical
remedy for the mortgagee, as the first two entail a great
loss of time and the third results in a discounted price
being bid at the foreclosure sale, since no buyer will pay
top dollar with the year redemption right attaching to the
property. The moneylender was, therefore, faced with a
serious problem in protecting his investment even though
the property was completely free of liens and the bor-
rowers indebted in no way to the Government at the time
the loan was made. The lender through no fault of his
own was liable to incur financial loss through the facets of
the tax laws which allowed the Government privileges
never afforded to ordinary creditors.
The situation was sorely recognized by those affected,
but every effort by the Bar Associations or Savings and
Loan Leagues to effect remedial legislation in Washington
was met with opposition frcm the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice, and the tax laws were not amended to afford relief.
Enter the Supreme Court: The Third Circuit Court of
Appeals, in a case involving a tract of land in Pennsyl-
vania, had held that the Government's tax lien - junior
to the mortgage - was effectively extinguished by fore-
closure proceedings wherein the United States was not a
party.4 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, ruling
on a California issue, decided that a foreclosure sale
wherein the Government had no notice and was not a
party, was ineffective to wipe out the junior lien as it could
be divested "only with the consent of the United States
and in the manner prescribed by Congress."' The conflict
between Circuits brought the case to the Supreme Court,
and it granted certiorari.6
1953) ; Integrity Trust Co. v. United States, 3 F. Supp. 577 (N.J. 1933);
Oden v. United States, 33 F. 2d 553 (W.D. La. 1929) ; and cases collected
In 174 A.L.R. 1373, 1403 (1948) and 105 A.L.R. 1244 (1936).
'United States v. Brosnan, 264 F. 2d 762 (3rd Cir. 1959).
United States v. ,Bank of America National Trust & Savings Associa-
tion, 265 F. 2d 862 (9th Cir. 1959).
0 361 U.S. 811 (1959).
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The opinion of the majority (Justice Harlan) cut through
the multitude of previously adjudicated Federal cases,
declaring that uniformity throughout the States was a
necessary objective to oil the machinery for the effective
collection of Federal taxes. The Court recognized that dif-
ferent states had different procedures for foreclosure -
some requiring a public sale, some not; some requiring
notice to junior lienors, others not. But, rejecting the
time-honored precept of uniformity, the Court declared,
"We believe that, so far as this Court is concerned, the
need for uniformity in this instance is outweighed by the
severe dislocation to local property relationships which
would result from our disregarding state procedures... ;
and the opinion continued, "We ... believe it desirable to
adopt as federal law state law governing divestiture of
federal tax liens .... "8
Having thus stated its objective, the Supreme Court set
about achieving it by declaring Sections 6325, 7424 and
24109 to be permissive only, and not mandatory directions
as to the exclusive methods for disposing of tax liens, as
had been held by the former decisions.'" (One cannot but
comment that these statutes - if not mandatory - will
quickly become as archaic and unused as those on our
books which authorized public whippings, for no sane
attorney with a title problem will add to his woes by
making the Government a party where the simpler, quicker
and more readily available state procedure will suffice.)
Justice Harlan declared that the legislative history of the
cited sections gave no evidence that Congress believed that
a suit to which the United States was a party was the only
way in which a Federal lien could be extinguished, and he
reasoned that those statutes were only enacted as optional
methods which could be used in addition to existing state
procedures. But it is respectfully submitted that this rea-
soning is difficult to follow. Consider, for instance, cer-
tain excerpts from the legislative debates preceeding en-
actment of these statutes as set out in footnotes to the
majority opinion:
"At the present time, in cases in which the lien
prior in time to that of the United States equals or
exceeds in amount the value of the property, there is
Supra, n. 1, 242.
Id., 241.
'Id., 246-250.10Supra, n. 3.
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no method whereby the lien for taxes may be dis-
charged without payment."'"
"In such circumstances, the mortgagee finds himself
at an impasse. It is impossible for him to bring about a
judicial sale of the property owing to the cloud upon
the title created by the Government's lien. He cannot
remove the lien as there is no method by which he may
bring the United States in as one of the parties to
the foreclosure proceeding. * * * The law provides and
equity dictates that the Government's lien in such
circumstances should have a junior status, yet under
the present practice the inability of the plaintiff to
bring the United States in as a party to the preceeding
to foreclosure or have execution and sale on a court
judgment where a Government lien is found to have
been placed, on the property subsequently to the time
of the plaintiff's encumbrance ties the hands of a prior
lien holder by making it impossible for him to grant a
clear title to the property and thus for no just reason
deprives him of the benefits of -his security or court
judgment as the case may be."12
"[B]ut this [state foreclosure] would do him
[mortgagee] no good unless he could get the United
States made a party to the proceeding in some way
so that the lien would be relieved on the part of the
Government.
"The foreclosure [in state court without the Gov-
ernment being a party] the gentleman speaks of could
not possibly discharge the Government's lien.' ' 3
It would seem apparent from these debates that Con-
gress was of the opinion that the tax lien was unaffected by
state procedures, and that the enactment of Section 2410
was specifically intended to alleviate the problem by al-
lowing the United States to be made a party to a state
foreclosure and thus have the lien extinguished. But,
apart from what can be gleaned from the legislative his-
tory as to the lawmakers' intent, there would appear to
be no purpose whatsoever to Section 2410 if prior to its
enactment federal liens were considered discharged by the
foreclosure of a senior encumbrance. The very enactment
Supra, n. 1, 247, fn. 11; Senate Committee, S. Rep. No. 398, 68th Con-
gress, 1st iSess. 46. Emphasis supplied.
12 Supra, n. 1, 248, fn. 11. House Committee, H. Rep. No. 95, 71st Con-
gress, 2nd 'Sess. 1-2. Emphasis supplied.
Supra, n. 1, 248-249, fn. 11. Rep. Graham (Pennsylvania). Emphasis
supplied.
[VOL. XXI
1961] TAX LIENS AND FORECLOSURES 127
of the statute presupposes that it has some purpose, and
if Congress had not thought a new statute necessary to
dispose of junior tax liens, why would it have cluttered up
the books with "permissive" legislation? If there were no
problem, there need be no remedial statute. However, the
highest court of the land has an exclusive monopoly on
mind reading when it comes to legislative intent, and we
can only hope that a new Congress agrees that its prede-
cessors meant - not what they said - but what the
Supreme Court decided they meant to say. If the new
Congress does not so agree, we can anticipate another
statute specifically declaring the status of tax liens in
state foreclosures and executions.
The final matter dealt with by the majority was the
objection by the United States that a judicial sale in a
state foreclosure case - if it disposed of the Government's
interest in the property - was actually a suit against the
United States, which could not be maintained without its
consent.14 Recognizing the merit in the Government's
argument, the Court nonetheless refused to extend the
principle of sovereign immunity from suit to such limits,
as such a principle would:
"... trespass upon the considerations which have led
to our refusal to fashion a federal rule of uniformity
respecting the extinguishment of federal junior liens
under state procedures. * * * Until Congress other-
wise determines, we think that state law is effective
to divest Government junior liens in cases such as
these." 5
Four justices dissented from the majority view," and
the vigorous minority opinion by Justice Clark took the
stand that the denial of uniformity in tax collection proce-
dures not only departed from the traditional approach of
the Supreme Court to similar problems, but that such
denial actually impairs the revenue of the United States.
It is difficult to argue with this latter statement, for, as
Justice Clark points out, the United States - as a junior
creditor - will not even receive notice of a foreclosure or
execution sale in order to lay claim to a surplus for unpaid
taxes.
While the minority holds out for a uniform rule applica-
ble in every state, it indicates that it would settle for a
1 4The -Siren, 7. Wall. 152 (U.S. 1868) ; Minnesota v. United States, 305
U.S. 382 (1939) ; United States v. Alabama, 313 U.S. 274 (1941).
11 Supra, n. 1, 251-252.
10 Chief Justice Warren, Mr. Justices Black, Frankfurter and Clark.
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requirement that the Government - if not made a party -
at least receive notice of the sale in time to protect its
interest in the property. Since the majority recognized
that Congress might well step in to clarify the situation,
it is a reasonable prediction that, as a compromise to the
rule of uniformity which will doubtless be pressed for by
the Government at the next legislative session, the law-
makers might well heed Justice Clark's plea for a require-
ment of notice to the Government, but otherwise 'allow the
disposition of Federal tax liens to be governed by state law.
While certain of the language used above may seem to
indicate that the writer is hypercritical of the majority
decision in these cases, such is not the case. It has long
been the opinion of the writer that the Federal Govern-
ment went entirely too far in protecting its liens. There is
no just or equitable reason why an individual or an institu-
tion which lends its money on an unencumbered piece of
real estate, must face the endless red-tape of discharge
procedures, or else get a depreciated price for the prop-
erty at public sale when the Government's right of redemp-
tion is made known to purchasers. Admittedly, the collec-
tion of revenue must be protected, but how far are we
from socialism when the interests of a central government
rise so far above - and actually discriminate against -
the interests of the individuals who make up the society?
We are in complete agreement with the result achieved by
the majority opinion, but it must be confessed that our
thoughts on the rules of stare decisis and statutory inter-
pretation may never again be the same.
Of particular interest to the Maryland practitioner is
the fact that he is no longer obliged to make a search of
the Federal Tax Lien Index right up to the very day of
the foreclosure sale. The purchaser will take the title as
held. by the owner at the time of the mortgage, regardless
of intervening Federal liens. Our procedure is such that
all junior liens are wiped out by foreclosure of a prior
encumbrance, 7 and tax liens now fall under the same rule.
In addition, even if the foreclosing party has actual knowl-
edge of the existence of a junior tax lien, he is not obliged
to make the United States a party to the suit, or even to
give notice of the foreclosure. Until Congress acts further,
the testy problem of tax liens in foreclosures and executions
has been alleviated.
"15 MD. CODa (1957) Art. 66, § 7(c) ; Madore v. Thompson, 155 Md. 676,
142 A. 529 (1928) ; Chilton v. Brooks, 71 Md. 445, 18 A. 868 (1889).
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